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Abstract 
The centrality of deception and secrecy to the Nazi extermination of the Jews has long been 
recognised, yet numerous questions remain regarding its significance for the ‘Final Solution’. 
This article examines Nazi attempts to cover up the first extermination camp established by 
the Third Reich at Chelmno. It demonstrates that in the Warthegau region of occupied 
Poland, the Nazis played a shell game to deceive victims and bystanders by pretending that 
deportees were transferred from the provinces to the Lodz ghetto, or from the Lodz ghetto to 
the provinces and to Germany. The contradictory cover stories used by the Nazis to obfuscate 
deportations to Chelmno succeeded for a while, but were eventually seen through. While 
Nazi deception measures are more vividly recorded in postwar testimonies, this article also 
shows that Nazi attempts to erase the physical evidence of mass murder through the 
cremation of the corpses can be documented much more extensively than hitherto appreciated 
using contemporary sources. Ultimately, both the attempted obfuscation and obliteration of 
the evidence for extermination at Chelmno failed. (173 words) 
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Covering Up Chelmno  
Nazi Attempts to Obfuscate and Obliterate an Extermination Camp 
 
Introduction 
The centrality of deception and secrecy to the Nazi extermination of the Jews has long been 
recognised, yet numerous questions remain regarding its significance for the ‘Final Solution’ 
and the histories of the Nazi extermination camps.
1
 The attempted cover-up of Nazi 
extermination policies was meant to obscure and obfuscate the reality of mass murder from 
multiple audiences of victims and bystanders. What did deception and secrecy mean to the 
perpetrators? How were they implemented and how effective were the cover stories put into 
place for different audiences? While much evidence that can contribute to answering these 
questions has been uncovered by historians, Ahlrich Meyer has noted that the phenomenon of 
deception has found too little attention in Holocaust research.
2
 
This article seeks to redress this desideratum through exploring Nazi attempts to cover 
up the first extermination camp established by the Third Reich, namely the improvised camp 
of Chelmno in the so-called Warthegau, located in western Poland on territory annexed to 
Germany. Beginning operation in December 1941, by the end of 1942 approximately 145,000 
Jews and up to 5,000 Roma and Sinti, with nearly half of all victims deported from the Lodz 
ghetto, had been murdered at Chelmno using gas vans by a detachment of SS and Police, the 
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 As early as 1961, Raul Hilberg emphasised the importance of ‘concealment’ to the smooth 
operation of the extermination camps. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews 
(Chicago: Quadrangle, 1961), pp.619-624. 
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 Ahlrich Meyer, Das Wissen um Auschwitz, Täter und Opfer der ‘Endlösung’ in Westeuropa 
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010), p.110. 
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SS-Sonderkommando Kulmhof. Closing for the first time in April 1943, the camp was 
reactivated in the spring of 1944, when a further 7,000 Jews were murdered, before the site 
was overrun by the Red Army in January 1945.  
While two histories of the camp have appeared in the past decade from Shmuel 
Krakowski and Patrick Montague, and despite the extensive literature on the Holocaust in the 
Warthegau and on the Lodz ghetto, much source material remains to be explored and 
integrated into our knowledge of ‘Hitler’s first death camp’.3 For reasons of space, this article 
will not examine how news of Chelmno reached the Polish underground and through them, 
the western Allies, subjects that have been exhaustively explored by Adam Puławski and 
Michael Fleming.
4
 Instead, this article will focus on two forms of cover-up used by the Nazis 
to camouflage mass murder at Chelmno. Firstly, it will outline the deceptions used to 
obfuscate the deportations of Jews from provincial towns and the Lodz ghetto, and contrast 
these with the deceptions attempted in the camp and village of Chelmno itself.  Alongside 
contemporary sources, numerous post-war testimonies recorded in several West German war 
crimes investigations are available to help reconstruct the deceptions circulating within the 
                                                 
3 Shmuel Ḳraḳowsḳi, Das Todeslager Chełmno/Kulmhof: der Beginn der "Endlösung" 
(Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007), translated as Chełmno: a small village in Europe: the first Nazi 
extermination camp (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2009); Krakowski’s book originally appeared 
in Hebrew in 2001; Patrick Montague, Chełmno and the Holocaust. The History of Hitler’s 
First Death Camp (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011) 
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 Adam Puławski, W obliczu Zagłady. Rząd RP na Uchodźstwie, Delegatura Rządu RP na 
Kraj, ZWZ-AK wobec deportacji Żydów do obozów zagłady (1941-1942) (Lublin: Instytut 
Pamięci Narodowej, 2009), pp.59-157; Michael Fleming, ‘Intelligence from Poland on 
Chełmno: British responses’, Holocaust Studies, 21:3, 2015, pp.172-190. 
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Warthegau.
5
 Secondly, the article will reconstruct the Nazi attempt to obliterate the physical 
evidence of mass murder by incinerating the corpses of the victims, using war crimes 
investigations as well as hitherto neglected contemporary documents drawn from the records 
of the Lodz Ghetto Administration (Gettoverwaltung Litzmannstadt)
 and the ‘Research 
Station A Litzmannstadt’ (Forschungsstelle A Litzmannstadt), a wiretapping service of the 
German Luftwaffe.
6
  
Nazi uses of deception and cover-up should not be seen in solely practical terms, but 
also provide important evidence of the meaning of genocide to the perpetrators. 
Misinformation was only one means of controlling the victims and preventing resistance or 
panic during deportations or upon arrival at an extermination site. Surprise, confinement, 
coercion and direct violence also played key roles, and could supersede the need for 
deception if necessary. When deception failed, as eventually occurred during the summer of 
1942, knowledge did not necessarily translate into resistance or escape attempts, whether in 
                                                 
5
 The investigations were coordinated by the Central Office for the State Justice 
Administrations for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes at Ludwigsburg, Germany. Alongside 
the investigation of the Higher SS and Police Leader Wilhelm Koppe and the Chelmno camp 
staff (AR-Z 69/59), I have drawn on the investigations of Günter Fuchs and Otto Bradfisch of 
the Lodz Gestapo (AR-Z 69a/59) and the investigation of Helmut Krizons of the Lodz 
Gestapo (AR-Z 161/67). 
6
 On the Lodz Ghetto Administration, see the pioneering study by Peter Klein, Die 
‘Gettoverwaltung Litzmannstadt’ 1940-1944: Eine Dienststelle im Spannungsfeld von 
Kommunalbürokratie und staatlicher Verfolgungspolitik (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 
2009). Records of the Gettoverwaltung Litzmannstadt have now been systematically digitised 
and are available in open-access through the Polish Digital Archive at 
http://www.szukajwarchiwach.pl/39/221/0/5.1.10/str/1/100#tabZespol  
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the tightly controlled Lodz ghetto or in provincial towns, for a variety of reasons.
7
 
Disinformation was not solely aimed at the victims, but also at the ethnic German population 
of the Warthegau inhabiting the same provincial towns as their Jewish neighbours. Although 
testimonies given up to thirty years after the events are undeniably problematic, both Jewish 
survivors as well as ethnic German bystanders recalled similar cover-stories, while ethnic 
Germans also recall learning of the true fate of deportees. Deception was thus intended to 
provide an alibi for genocide, not only to restrict knowledge of mass murder among the 
ethnic German civilian population and local officialdom, but also to euphemise 
extermination. As this article will show, the deceptions used in the Warthegau frequently 
contradicted each other, while the attempted cover-up through cremation ended up 
confirming the crime. The ultimate purpose of deception and cover-up may well have been to 
mask the transgression of genocide from the Nazi regime itself.
8
 
 
The Shell Game of ‘Resettlement’ in the Warthegau 
The deceptions used to obfuscate deportations to the extermination camp of Chelmno 
undoubtedly owed much to the prolonged debate within the Nazi administration of the 
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 No armed resistance was able to emerge in the Lodz ghetto, unlike in Warsaw, as is widely 
discussed. Isaiah Trunk, ‘Note: Why Was There No Armed Resistance against the Nazis in 
the Lodz Ghetto?’, Jewish Social Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3/4 (Summer-Autumn, 1981), pp.329-
334 
8
 Dan Stone, ‘Genocide as Transgression’, European Journal of Social Theory 7/1 (2004), 
pp.45–65 
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Warthegau over the fate of the Jews from 1939 to 1941.
9
 In November 1939, the 
Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler had demanded the expulsion of all Jews from the newly 
annexed territories of western Poland into the Government-General, an order which soon ran 
aground against practical difficulties.
10
 During 1940, officials hoped for an eventual 
expulsion of the Jews of the Warthegau into the Government-General, even as the need to 
accommodate ethnic German ‘resettlers’ from the Baltic states and Volhynia placed a greater 
urgency on the expulsion of the Polish rural population. As late as November 1940, the 
Wehrmacht in the Government-General was told to expect 330,000 Jews from the 
Warthegau.
11
 Yet the abortive ‘third short-range plan’ could only guarantee the expulsion of 
Poles. Local officials in the provincial counties of the Warthegau hoped to resettle 100,000 
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 This phase of Nazi ‘Jewish policy’ in the Warthegau is exhaustively covered in among other 
works, Götz Aly, ‘Endlösung’. Völkerverschiebung und der Mord an der europäischen Juden 
(Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1995); Michael Alberti, Die Verfolgung und Vernichtung der 
Juden im Reichsgau Wartheland 1939-1945 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006); Gordon J. 
Horwitz, Ghettostadt: Łódź and the making of a Nazi city (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 2008); Klein, Gettoverwaltung Litzmannstadt’; Catherine 
Epstein, Model Nazi Arthur Greiser and the occupation of Western Poland (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
10
 Der Reichsführer-SS als Reichskommissar zu Festigung deutschen Volkstums, Anordnung 
I/II, Oct. 30, 1939, gez. Himmler, Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej (hereafter AIPN), 
NTN 332, p.10. On the failure of the ‘first short range plan’ and the impact on the Jews of the 
Warthegau, see Alberti, Verfolgung und Vernichtung, pp.126-146. 
11
 Fernschreiben Militärbefehlshaber im Generalgouvernement Ia Nr 3186/40 geh. an 
Heeresgruppe B, Ansiedlung der Juden und Polen, Dec. 27, 1940, Tsentral’ny Arkhiv 
Ministerstva Oborony Rossioskoi Federatsii 500-12454-100, p.5. 
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Jews into the Lodz ghetto, but this was deemed impossible.
12
 Contradicting the aim of 
deporting Jews was the growing importance of Jewish forced labour to the local economy. By 
March 1941, therefore, officials began to think in terms of parting only with Jews unfit for 
work, who it was hoped could be deported at a later date further east.
13
 During the summer of 
1941, officials in the counties and in Lodz struggled over whether provincial Jews could be 
concentrated in the ‘central ghetto’ of Lodz or if Jews from Lodz could be resettled into the 
countryside.
15
 By August 1941, the concept of ‘village ghettos’ had been rejected, while the 
transfer of sick and unfit Jews from the provinces to the Lodz ghetto had been forbidden.
16
 
Artur Greiser’s decision to exterminate 100,000 Jews unfit for work in the Warthegau, 
taken at the latest by the start of October 1941
17
, necessitated the working-out of a suitable 
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 Umwandererzentralstelle Posen IV/1 f. Kr./En. Tgb.-Nr. 1080/41, 3. Nahplan, Jan. 6, 1941, 
AIPN NTN 36, pp.144-5. 
13
 Aly, ‘Endlösung’, pp.264-5; Klein, Gettoverwaltung, p.226. 
15
 Alberti, Verfolgung und Vernichtung, pp.339-372. 
16
 Forschungsstelle A Litzmannstadt, Meldung zu Auswertefragen Nr. 187, Vermerk: 
Einrichtung v. Dorfgettos, Aug. 15, 1941, Yad Vashem Archive (hereafter YVA) O.51/13, 
p.212; Regierungspräsident Litzmannstadt, Einweisung kranker Juden aus den Landkreisen in 
das Getto Litzmannstadt, Aug. 16, 1941, gez. Uebelhör, Archiwum Żydowskiego Instytutu 
Historycznego (hereafter AŻIH) 233/44, p.726. 
17
 In addition to the monographs cited above, see also the essays by Ian Kershaw, 
‘Improvised Genocide? The Emergence of the ‘Final Solution’ in the ‘Warthegau’,’ 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th Series, 2, 1992, pp.51-78 and Jacek Andrzej 
Młynarczyk, ‘Mordinitiativen von unten. Die Rolle Arthur Greisers und Odilo Globocnik im 
Entscheidungsprozess zum Judenmord’ in: Jacek Andrzej Młynarczyk and Jochen Böhler 
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set of cover-stories. In November 1941, Nazi labour officials informed counterparts from 
other ‘annexed territories’ that the Warthegau was now only a ‘transit station’ and that by the 
end of March 1942, all Jews other than those fit for work would be ‘deported’, without 
elaborating further on their eventual destination.
18
 Internally, it sufficed within the Nazi 
bureaucracy to speak intransitively of ‘evacuation’ and remain silent on where the 
‘evacuated’ Jews were to go. However, this internal correspondence consistently identified 
the ‘evacuees’ or ‘resettlers’ as unfit for work.19 For example, a telephone conversation 
recorded by the ‘Research Station A Litzmannstadt’ spoke of the ‘resettlement of 16,000 
unfit Jews – entire families are involved’ from the Lodz ghetto in January 1942.20 
By contrast, the cover-story presented to the victims as well as to the German 
population of provincial counties was more elaborate. Initially, the SS and Police units 
carrying out deportations
21
 seem to have referred from time to time to ‘resettlement to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
(eds), Der Judenmord in den eingegliederten polnischen Gebieten 1939-1945 (Osnabrück: 
fibre, 2010), pp.27-56. 
18
 Vermerk der unter Vorsitz von Herrn MinDir. Mansfeld erfolgten Ressortbesprechung, 
Nov. 22, 1941, BArch R 22/2057, p.208. 
19
 Der Amtskommissar des Amtsbezirks Sluzewo, Betr.: Evakuierung der nichtarbeitsfähigen 
Juden, Erfassung von Vermögenswerten, Bezug: Verfügung des Herrn Reichsstatthalters vom 
1.5.42 – I/13 022-150 g, May 18, 1942, Archiwum Państwowe w Łodzi (hereafter APŁ) 
221/29667, p.238. 
20
 Meldung zu Auswertefragen Nr. 244, Betr.: Litzmannstädter Getto, Jan. 16, 1942, YVA 
O.51/13, p.221 
21
 For overviews of the deportations in the Warthegau to Chelmno, see Danuta Dabrowska, 
‘Zagłada skupisk zydowskich w “Kraju Warty” w okresie okupacji hitlerowskiej’, Biuletyn 
Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego  13/14, 1955, pp.122-184; Krakowski, Das Todeslager 
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east’. From late September to late November 1941, Sonderkommando Lange conducted a 
series of mobile killing operations in Konin and Kalisz counties using gas vans, prior to the 
establishment of Chelmno.
22
 According to reports reaching the Warsaw ghetto regarding 
these initial mobile actions as well as the first phase of Chelmno, ‘in the second half of 
November 1941 the news spread in the cities of the Koło district (Warthbrücken district) that 
the entire Jewish population of this area had to be transferred to the region of Pinsk or to 
eastern Galicia.’23 Yet the resort to such deceptions was inconsistent. Polish and Jewish 
underground reports noted that the deportations were carried out in silence: ‘Officially, the 
purpose of this deportation is not revealed to the deportees, but in private the Germans have 
launched a different version: a center for the entire district will set up at Chełmno, which will 
be one stage of the transfer into the region of Pinsk or to Galicia.’24 Michał Podchlebink, one 
                                                                                                                                                        
Chełmno/Kulmhof, pp. 75-104; ‘Warthegau Region (Reichsgau Wartheland)’ in: Martin Dean 
(ed.), The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 
1933-1945, Volume II: Ghettos in German-Occupied Eastern Europe, Part A (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2012), pp.33-130. 
22
 Alberti, Verfolgung und Vernichtung, pp.412-415; Montague, Chelmno and the Holocaust, 
pp.32-47. 
23 Wypadki chełmiński, March1942, in: Aleksandra Bańkowska (ed), Archiwum 
Ringelbluma: Konspiracyjne Archiwum Getta Warszawy. 11, Ludzie i prace "Oneg Szabat" 
(Warsaw: Wydawn. Naukowe PWN, 2013), p.300. 
24 Wydarzenia w Chełmnie nad Nerem, circa Jan.1942, in: Ewa Wiatr, Barbara Engelking, 
Alina Skibińska (eds), Archiwum Ringelbluma: Konspiracyjne Archiwum Getta Warszawy. 
13, Ostatnim etapem przesiedlenia jest śmierć: Pomiechówek, Chełmno nad Nerem, 
Treblinka (Warsaw: Wydawn. Naukowe PWN, 2013), p.114; a virtually identical remark can 
be found in the report by the Delegatura from March 1942 on ‘mass executions of Jews in 
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of the few survivors who escaped Chelmno in 1942, testified that German policemen told the 
Jews being deported by truck from the town of Koło, ‘don’t be afraid, they are going to take 
you to the  Barlogi train station and from there to the East.’25 At the beginning of March 
1942, the Jews of Krośniewice were informed that they were to be resettled to Bessarabia, in 
eastern Romania.
26
 
From a very early stage, such cover stories likely failed to reassure the victims that 
deportation did not equal death. In January 1942, Podchlebnik escaped together with Shlomo 
Winer from Chelmno
27
, and the two fugitives spread knowledge of the extermination camp to 
a number of ghettos on their flight path out of the region, including the Krośniewice ghetto.28 
In Turek county, where Jews had been concentrated into the rural district of Heidemühle, 
knowledge of Chelmno, situated only 30 kilometers away, was brought by Polish peasants.
29
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Koło county’. Aneks nr 28 na czas od 16 do 21 III 1942, Załącznik: Masowe egzekucje 
Żydów w pow. Kolskim, Archiwum Akt Nowych DR 202/III-8, pp.100-102, here p.100. 
25
 Protokół przesłuchania swiadka Michał Podchlebnik, June 9, 1945, AIPN GK 165/271, t.1, 
p.14. 
26 Drugi etap, April 1942 in: Bańkowska (ed), Archiwum Ringelbluma 11, p.308.  
27
 Often identified as ‘Szlamek’, the pseudonym he used after escaping to the Warsaw ghetto. 
See Przemysław Nowicki, ‘Zanim „przybył z zaświatów”, nazywał się Winer. Krąg rodzinny 
i konspiracyjny Szlamka, uciekiniera z ośrodka zagłady w Chełmnie nad Nerem’, Zagłada 
Żydów, 2009, pp.162-192. 
28
 As indicated by a letter sent by Róża Kapłan to the Warsaw ghetto in January 1942. Róża 
Kapłan, Krośniewice an Her [sic] R. Gelbart, Warszawa, Jan. 21, 1942, in: Ruta Sakowska 
(ed), Archiwum Ringelbluma.  Konspiracyjne Archiwum Getta Warszawy. Tom 1: Listy o 
Zagładzie (Warsaw: Wydawn. Naukowe PWN, 1997), p. 35. 
29
 Vernehmung Hersz J., Sep. 14, 1960, BArch B 162/3361, p.194R. 
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A survivor of the Łask ghetto recalled that Chelmno was known well before the deportation 
action  in August 1942, claiming that ‘as far as Lodz there were rumors that Jews from the 
entire Warthegau were being liquidated there.’30 
Other testimonies of survivors of the provincial deportation actions indicate, however, 
that such knowledge was far from universal. More strikingly still, ethnic German inhabitants 
of the same towns testified more often than not to total ignorance of extermination at 
Chelmno. Both groups of witnesses confirm a pattern of attempted obfuscation of the 
deportations’ true destination and purpose. Rumors circulated between both groups, 
especially between native-born ethnic Germans and Jewish personal acquaintances. In Łask, 
one ethnic German recalled that 
For a long time before the big resettlement action the talk was that the Jews 
would all be taken away. Our house Jew, named Sandmann, also told me about it, 
and said Herr Hitler would let all the Jews go to Madagascar. It even transpired 
that the Jews had already packed for this transport. Then it was said that the Jews 
were being resettled to China, but these were all more or less rumors.
31
 
Rumors of gassing thus circulated alongside rumors of resettlement. In Pabianice, an 
ethnic German ‘resettler’ from Rovno in Volhynia recalled that ‘it was said by way of rumor, 
the Jews went “all away for gassing”,’32 a rumor that failed to reach some Jewish survivors of 
the ghetto, who professed ignorance after the war of where the deportees had been taken.
33
  
By far the most common legend was one that was evidently propagated as a deliberate 
deception aimed at both victims as well as bystanders, namely deportation not for 
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 Vernehmung Szraga N., Sep. 9, 1963, BArch B 162/7418, p.85. 
31
 Vernehmung Oskar Wolfinger, Sep. 17, 1971, BArch B 162/7419, p.30. 
32
 Zeugenvernehmung Anna B., Nov. 29, 1966, BArch B 162/7439, p.85.  
33
 Vernehmung Bluma M., July 5, 1972, BArch B 162/7418, p.326. 
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‘resettlement’ but for ‘labour deployment’ (Arbeitseinsatz). In Wieluń, a deportation to 
Chelmno of 1,500 Jews deemed unfit for work around Eastertime was passed off as a labour 
transfer, with survivors being told ‘they will go to other places for labour deployment’, a 
reassurance that was repeated during the August 1942 final liquidation of the Wieluń ghetto. 
“We did not then know where the majority of Jews from Wieluń went,” recalled one 
survivor. “They told us they were going for labour deployment. But we were already 
assuming that they would all be killed.”34 Ethnic German neighbours had followed the 
departing trucks during the Easter deportation and returned to say that all had been gassed.
35
 
The decision to select Jews fit for work from the provincial ghettos and concentrate 
them in the ‘work ghetto of the Gau’ (Gau-Arbeitsghetto) in Lodz provided the deportation 
organisers the perfect cover story to offer to the German inhabitants. The deportation of unfit 
Jews to what was euphemistically called a ‘supply camp’ in one internal discussion could be 
obfuscated by pretending that all deportees had been sent to Lodz.36 In Brzeziny, ‘it was said 
at the time that they had all been transported to the Lodz ghetto’, recalled the local 
administrator, Amtskommissar Otto Rösler.
37
 Theophil Stapel, a Volhynian German ‘resettler’ 
who had become one of the officials in Rösler’s Amtskommissariat, similarly recalled that 
even though ‘it was generally said that the Jews would be liquidated’, nonetheless ‘a work 
assignment at another place was indeed promised to the Jews.’ That the Judenrat chairman in 
Brzeziny did not believe this fiction was increasingly less important than whether local 
                                                 
34
 Vernehmung Zenek P., June 20, 1972 (first citation); Isek J., June 27, 1972 (second 
citation), BArch B 162/7418, pp. 233,284.  
35
 Vernehmung Martin P., July 3, 1972, BArch B 162/7418, p.317. 
36
 Meldung zu Auswertefragen Nr. 284/42, Betr. Getto Litzmannstadt, April 22, 42, YVA 
O.51/13, p.319. 
37
 Vernehmung Otto Rösler, Aug. 6, 1971, BArch B 162/7423, p.63. 
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German towndwellers, officials and policemen believed it.
38
 A policeman stationed in 
Bełchatów, from where 4,953 Jews were reported as ‘resettled’ by the population registration 
office
39
, believed that he had heard that ‘they were brought into the big ghetto in Lodz.’40 
Even the selection of Jews into an able-bodied group and a conspicuously unfit group of 
children, elderly and sick could be rationalised away using the claim of a ‘transfer to Lodz’ . 
A post office worker in Bełchatów believed that the deportees ‘went, as far as we were told, 
to the Lodz ghetto and most energetic and industrious were to be brought to work in 
Germany.’41 Similar stories circulated in Wieruszow. Like his counterpart in Brzeziny, 
Amtskommissar Alfred Ryba claimed not to have been told where the deportation commando 
from Lodz had taken the Jews. ‘In my opinion they were transported to the Lodz ghetto,’ he 
stated in 1972.
 42 
Returning to Wieruszow in 1943 on leave after his call-up to the 
Wehrmacht, Johann Rozitski was told by his wife that the Jews were gone. ‘At the time it 
was said,’ he remembered, ‘that they had all gone to Lodz.’43 While some German bystanders 
might have internalised the Lodz explanation to repress more unpleasant memories, or might 
have been influenced by the post-war social consensus in West Germany that the ‘Final 
Solution’ was kept entirely secret44, the sheer repetition of the Lodz story suggests this was 
                                                 
38
 Vernehmung Theophil Stapel, June 16, 1971, BArch B 162/7423, pp.48-54. 
39
 Den Wehrmeldeamt Łask in Pabianice, Belchatow, Sep. 19, 1942, AŻIH 233/43, p.126. 
40
 Vernehmung Paul R., Nov. 2, 1961, BArch B 162/7440, p.107. 
41
 Vernehmung Eugenie K., July 23, 1971, BArch B 162/7423, p.103. 
42
 Vernehmung Alfred Ryba, Dec. 13, 1967, BArch B 162/7435, p.42; Jan. 18, 1972, B 
162/7423, p.124. 
43
 Vernehmung Johann Rozitski, Sep. 14, 1971, BArch B 162/7419, p.5. 
44
 See on this Bernward Dörner, Die Deutschen und der Holocaust. Was niemand wissen 
wollte, aber jeder wissen konnte (Berlin: Proyläen, 2007), pp.493-602 
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indeed the one most frequently heard in 1942 during the deportations from provincial towns 
in the Warthegau. 
How much were the ‘resettlement actions’ discussed among the German inhabitants of 
these provincial towns? One resident of Bełchatów claimed that ‘at the time not much was 
said about the fate of the Jews’, a circumspection that helped the half-truth of a transfer to 
Lodz take firmer root.
45
 By contrast, another Bełchatów resident recalled that the Lodz story 
was explained ‘in public.’46 A resident of Łask thought that nothing was said in the town 
regarding the deportations, noting that ‘even in private circles we didn’t speak at the time of 
the fate of the Jews’, as they had ‘much too much fear’ to talk about it.”47 In Ozorków, a 
resident recalled that it had been explained that the deported Jews were to be taken to another 
ghetto, but that further discussion was stifled by a ‘great curtain of silence.’48 By contrast, 
public disquiet could force officials in other towns to propagate ‘fake news’ publicly. In 
Poddębice, the brutal execution of the ‘resettlement’, as well as rumours spread from Dabie 
of gassing reaching the ears of the local forester
49
, led to a townhall meeting to address the 
murmuring, as one resident recalled after the war: 
As the local inhabitants were in an uproar about the deportation of the Jews, a 
meeting was convened by Landrat Kollmeier. I was also present at this meeting. 
                                                 
45
 Vernehmung Magda F., July 20, 1971, BArch B 162/7423, p.82. 
46
 Vernehmung Robert Z., Sep. 15, 1971, BArch B 162/7419, p.23. 
47
 Vernehmung Irmgard Sch., Sep. 16, 1971, BArch B 162/7419, p.27. 
48
 Verrnehmung Eugenie St., Sep. 21, 1971, BArch B 162/7419, p.41. For other reiterations 
of the Lodz transfer story by former residents of Bełchatów, see Vernehmung Maria Kl., Sep. 
21, 1971; Alma W., Sep. 27, 1971; Alma P., Sep. 27, 1971; Reinhold R., June 28, 1971, 
BArch B 162/7419, pp.36-37, 45, 47, 90. 
49
 Vernehmung Alfred Dönst, Jan 3, 1962, BArch B 162/7430, p.48. 
14 
 
In the assembly, we were told that the excitement because of the Jews was 
groundless, since they were only moved to another place and nothing would 
happen to them.
50
 
Overt attempts to reassure the German population such as this were rare, but they 
strikingly mirror the dissembling of Nazi officials towards the inhabitants of the Lodz ghetto, 
to which this article now turns.
51
  
 
Deceiving the Lodz Ghetto 
While the deceptions used to cover the deportations from Lodz to Chelmno are much better 
known than the obfuscations used in the smaller towns, they take on a new significance when 
contrasted with the story of a transfer to the Lodz ghetto that circulated in the provinces. Not 
only did the deceptions used in Lodz contradict those disseminated in the provinces, but the 
cover stories passed on in Lodz contradicted themselves. On December 16, 1941, the Lodz 
‘eldest of the Jews’, Chaim Rumkowski, was first informed of the impending resettlement of 
20,000 Jews by the Ghetto Administration. Rumkowski informed the Jewish council that 
‘apparently, those to be resettled will be sent to smaller towns in the Generalgouvernement, 
to centers where food supply will not be as difficult as it is in the large cities.’52 This story 
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broadly conformed to the contemporaneous deceptions during provincial deportations that 
emphasised ‘the east’ as the ultimate destination of the ‘resettlers’.  
Yet by February 1942, rumours circulated in the ghetto that the deportees from the first 
action ‘were in Koło county and also in the vicinity of Brześć Kujawski.’53 This shift 
westwards was then ‘confirmed’ in April:  
It has now been irrefutably established that the camp is located in the region 
bordering directly on the town of Koło, now called Warthbrücken. The camp 
houses about 100,000 Jews, indicating that besides the 44,000 resettled from this 
ghetto, Jews from other cities have been concentrated in that camp. This gigantic 
camp was formerly a living site for Germans from Volhynia. Apparently 30,000 
people had been living there. They left the barracks in perfectly decent order, and 
even left their furniture for the Jews to use.
 54
 
The source of this information was identified as a ‘high officer of the secret police’. 
This was in all probability SS-Hauptsturmführer Hans Bothmann, the new commander of SS-
Sonderkommando Kulmhof, who had replaced SS-Hauptsturmführer Herbert Lange in March 
1942.
55
 His claim that the Jews resettled from Lodz were now housed in a ‘gigantic’ former 
camp for Volhynian Germans is a striking example of the continued entanglement of the 
resettlement of ethnic Germans with the extermination of the Jews. Just as striking is the 
silence of the Lodz ghetto chroniclers regarding the flagrant contradiction between December 
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1941’s eastward direction and April 1942’s news of resettlement to the west.56 In May 1942, 
when German, Austrian and Czech Jews deported in October and November 1941 from the 
‘Reich’ were deported onwards to Chelmno, the news of the ‘gigantic camp’ near Koło was 
disregarded, and the talk was once more of resettlement to the east. ‘There is a persistent 
rumor in the ghetto that the first two transports of deportees will be sent to occupied France 
and the remainder, to Bessarabia,’ the ghetto chroniclers noted.57 At no time subsequently 
during 1942 was any other destination officially announced. 
Postwar testimonies of survivors of the Lodz ghetto confirm and complicate the picture 
painted by contemporary sources.
58
 Simon W. recalled that before the first wave of transports 
in January and February 1942, it had been said that the deportees would be resettled ‘in a 
village that had previously been inhabited by Poles.’59 The fact that baggage was left behind 
in Marysin square after the departure of transports was the first ominous sign that deportation 
meant death. While survivors frequently testified to learning of Chelmno while still 
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imprisoned in the ghetto, many do not indicate when they acquired this knowledge.
60
 Only 
rarely did survivors claim after the war to have heard of Chelmno during the first half of 
1942.
61
 
Knowledge of extermination in the ghetto hardened slowly into certainty after the 
return of clothing and property plundered from the deportees at Chelmno via a sorting depot 
set up at Pabianice. The head of the Ghetto Administration, Hans Biebow, sought the 
approval of the Lodz Gestapo for this, and was told only to ensure that ‘any letters, pictures, 
certificates etc’ were removed.62 This decision, made to rationalise the economic exploitation 
of plunder, proved to be a colossal breach of secrecy, as the sanitization of such clues was far 
from complete. While residents of the village of Chelmno were soon informed that clothing 
was shipped to Lodz
63
, so too did ghetto inmates swiftly realise from late May 1942 onwards 
that deportees’ clothing was being returned.64 Many claimed to have recognised specific 
items of clothing or baggage owned by family members.
65
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The transfer of 17,000 able-bodied Jews from provincial ghettos was another route 
through which the certainty that deportation meant death, as well as knowledge of Chelmno, 
spread through the Lodz ghetto.
66
 Many survivors selected for work in provincial ghettos 
reported only learning of Chelmno after their arrival in Lodz.
67
 Less frequently, survivors 
claimed to have learned of Chelmno from more concrete sources of information. Lillian S., a 
fourteen-year old in 1942, thought she learned about the extermination camp from radio 
reports, but had not believed them at the time.
68
  While there were indeed clandestine radio 
listeners in the Lodz ghetto
69
, and news of Chelmno had been broadcast on the BBC
70
, there 
is little further corroboration. Henry T. recalled that letters were found in clothing returned to 
the ghetto for sorting that spoke of gassings in Chelmno.
71
 The controversial Gestapo 
informant David Gertler, the head of the economic section of the ghetto police force, testified 
that an escapee from Chelmno reached the ghetto in July 1942, so that it was clear to 
Rumkowski and himself from this point on what deportation really meant.
72
 The rabbi of 
Grabów had written to both the Warsaw and Lodz ghettos on January 19, 1942, conveying 
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the news of Chelmno brought by Shlomo ‘Szlamek’ Winer, but whether the letter arrived, to 
whom it was sent, and whether they passed on the news is unknown.
73 
 
The ‘Sperre’ action of September 1942, during which 15,000 sick, elderly and children 
selected as unfit for work were rounded up directly by the Gestapo, Police and Ghetto 
Administration, marked the moment at which certainty regarding the deaths of deportees 
became near-universal in the Lodz ghetto.
74
 However, some survivors, in particular former 
members of the Jewish ghetto police, claimed that even after the ‘Sperre’, they still did not 
know of extermination.
75
 The ghetto policemen may well have been reluctant to admit 
knowledge, or have repressed the memory of hearing rumours about Chelmno, out of guilt or 
shame at their potential complicity. 
 Despite the brutality of the ‘Sperre’ action, the Nazi authorities persisted in developing 
new fictions regarding the whereabouts of the unfit deportees, claiming that they had been 
taken to ‘rest homes’ in order to ‘raise labour productivity in the ghetto.’76 When children’s 
clothing was returned to the ghetto, it was claimed that the deported children had been given 
uniforms in their new ‘care homes’. 77 In  November 1942, the Lodz Gestapo cynically 
reported that ‘the Jews have simmered down about the last evacuation (elderly and children 
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under 10 years). The worry over their relatives, of whom there is no news, persists as 
previously.’78  
It is unclear from the surviving documents and postwar testimonies whether the Nazis 
expected the shell game of ‘resettlement’ to and from the Lodz ghetto that they orchestrated 
in front of Jewish victims and German bystanders to last. While many of the nearly 800,000 
Germans living in the Warthegau were either fooled or chose to believe the alibi of 
‘resettlement’79, Jewish survivors increasingly saw through the deceptions, even as the Nazis 
insisted on adding new embellishments to their dissembling. The contradictory destinations 
passed off before different audiences at different times may well have made it impossible for 
the organisers of mass murder in the Warthegau to do more than blankly deny knowledge 
when interrogated after the war. Ad hoc obfuscations did not generate an actual alibi, as Artur 
Greiser found to his cost at his trial in Poland during 1946
80
, and as the head of the Lodz 
Gestapo, Otto Bradfisch, discovered when on trial in West Germany in the 1960s.
81
 Neither 
man spoke of ‘resettlement to the east’ or admitted having heard of Chelmno. 
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Deceptions in the Camp and Village of Chelmno 
The deportees’ path to Chelmno often passed through churches and synagogues; during 
‘resettlement’ actions in some provincial towns, Catholic churches were a preferred holding-
pen. In the first phase of the camp’s operations, victims were held in the synagogue at Koło 
before being taken by truck to the mansion in Chelmno village. En route, the victims left 
traces of their desperation and conviction that they were being transported to their deaths, 
smashing out the windows of the church in Pabianice
82
, and leaving extensive graffiti in the 
Koło synagogue. Alongside names and dates, an unknown victim left the following 
exhortation: ‘Jews, do not wait, you will be here one day, then you will go to the fire – 13th  
transport.’83 The ‘fire’ was metaphorical rather than real: at this time, cremation had yet to 
begin at Chelmno. 
Upon arrival at the mansion in Chelmno village, the victims were greeted with a 
welcome speech delivered by a member of SS-Sonderkommando Kulmhof. At least eight 
members of the Sonderkommando are known to have given the welcome speech.
84
 Kurt 
Möbius, a member of the police guard assigned to the mansion, testified to one variant of the 
speech: ‘they were told thay they would go to a large camp in Austria where they would have 
to work. But first, they were told, they would have to take a bath, and their clothes would 
have to be deloused.’85 The victims were then invited to undress on the ground floor, and 
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taken through a corridor to the ramp, which was in fact a ramp into the back of one of the 
three gas vans operating at Chelmno in 1942. 
The shower/bath deception, copied from the T4 ‘institutes’ of the Nazi euthanasia 
program, became a standard feature of the extermination camps, and was used in Auschwitz, 
Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka as well as at Chelmno. In 1940 and 1941, the first incarnation 
of Sonderkommando Lange had carried out euthanasia killings across the Warthegau and in 
East Prussia at a variety of sites, and the deception routine was probably developed during 
these actions.
86
 While the hygienic deception did not vary, the promises made to the victims 
did. These contradicted earlier stories that victims might have heard in provincial towns or 
the Lodz ghetto. Rather than a site in the ‘east’ or the Warthegau, the victims were now told 
they would be working in Austria, a labour camp in Germany
87
 or simply taken to an 
unspecified labour camp.
88
 SS testimonies do not indicate whether this speech was varied if 
the victims consisted of children, the elderly and the manifestly unfit for work. Nor, unlike 
the Ukrainian ‘Trawniki guards’ at Belzec and Treblinka89, did they note any increase in 
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resistance from the victims over the lifespan of the camp. While some victims proved 
reluctant to comply, and had to be whipped into the van
90
, only one testimony indicates that 
they might have known of their impending fate. ‘What you have said to us is untrue,’ Kurt 
Möbius was told on one occasion by a victim.
91
 
Not until the second phase of the camp’s existence in the summer of 1944 was any 
sustained attempt made to persuade or force the victims to write deceptive postcards to 
relatives. In July 1944, 31 postcards marked on the 19
th
 of the month were received in the 
Lodz ghetto from recent deportees.
92
 A single testimony from a Lodz ghetto survivor 
believed that parents of children deported in 1942 received letters by way of deception.
93
 
Given that over half of Chelmno’s victims in 1941/1942 were deported from provincial 
ghettos, such deceptions might have been seen as unnecessary. 
As the exhaustive investigation by Judge Władysław Bednarz in 1945 revealed, it was 
impossible to fully conceal the operations of Sonderkommando Kulmhof from the local 
population. Gas vans were sent for repair to Koło, the guards were housed inside the village 
itself, and only a 2 meter high wooden fence screened the departure of the vans from the 
mansion to the so-called ‘forest camp’.94 In the unanimous opinion of local inhabitants, 
within a matter of weeks or months, the true purpose of Chelmno became clear to them, 
despite tentative attempts to obfuscate this earlier. In November 1941, when the camp was 
first established, the SS told the local Amtskommissar Konrad Schulz that they were setting 
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up a transit camp for Jews.
95
 Schulz then informed the local schoolteacher, Erhard Michelson. 
In keeping with the late 1941 cover story of ‘resettlement to the east’, Michelson remembered 
that ‘the SS men told him that Jews would pass through here on their way to Russia.’96 The 
fiction of a ‘transit camp’ was also maintained towards the county Landrat and provincial 
governor, when two Polish prisoners assigned to the Sonderkommando as labourers became 
infected with typhus.
97
 Further attempts after January 1942 to pass off the mansion as a 
transit camp, whether towards local officialdom or residents, are recorded neither in 
contemporary sources nor in postwar testimonies. At the latest by the summer of 1942 and 
the onset of mass cremations in the ‘forest camp’, the reality of mass extermination at 
Chelmno was undoubtedly clear to every inhabitant of the village and surrounding area. 
 
‘The Jews Buried in a Little Wood near Kulmhof’: Cremation at Chelmno 
The mass cremation of the victims’ corpses was the ultimate form of cover-up used in the 
Nazi extermination camps. Although crematoria had been in use in the concentration camps 
since before the outbreak of war, little thought was given until early 1942 to obliterating the 
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physical evidence of genocide across Eastern Europe. In the spring of 1942, the Reich 
Security Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt, RSHA) tasked SS-Standartenführer Paul 
Blobel, the former commander of Sonderkommando 4a and one of the chief organisers of the 
Babi Yar massacre in 1941, with overseeing ‘Aktion 1005’. This was the codename given to 
the operation to erase the traces of Nazi genocide through incinerating the corpses of the 
victims.
98
 The two leading scholars of ‘Aktion 1005’, Jens Hoffmann and Andrej Angrick, 
have both emphasised fears of discovery within the Nazi regime following the retreat from 
Moscow at the end of 1941 and the first Soviet accusations of mass murder as a plausible 
explanation for the initiation of ‘Aktion 1005’.99 
Intriguingly, the document that may well have bequeathed Blobel’s operation the 
codename 1005, a response by Gestapo chief Heinrich Müller to an anonymous letter ‘about 
alleged acts in the solution of the Jewish Question in the Warthegau.’100 While Müller was 
dismissive of the letter, only shortly beforehand, Sonderkommando Kulmhof had seen two 
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prisoners escape, and other attempts followed.
101
 The ‘Jewish referent’ of the Lodz Gestapo, 
Günter Fuchs, recalled having to search the Lodz ghetto for two escaped Jews from Hans 
Bothmann’s Sonderkommando.102 
In March 1942, as Blobel returned to Germany after recovering in Kharkov from 
illness, he was summoned to a meeting in Warsaw by Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the 
RSHA, and according to his driver’s testimony, afterwards indicated that he had a new 
task.
103
 After further convalescent leave, Blobel travelled to Chelmno in June or July 1942, 
together with his driver and several assistants.
104
 On July 15, 1942, the SS Cavalry Brigade, 
then refitting in Debica, was asked to supply a flamethrower unit, safety clothes and gloves to 
‘SS-Sonderkommando Blobel.’105 Blobel’s presence at Chelmno was recalled by several 
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members of the Sonderkommando, who also remembered some of the experiments in 
destroying the bodies that he conducted during the summer and autumn of 1942.
106
 Both the 
Sonderkommando Kulmhof member Kurt Möbius as well as the forester Heinz May, who 
was tasked with supplying the camp with wood for the cremations, remembered experiments 
with thermite that inadvertently set the woods around the gravesites in the ‘forest camp’ on 
fire.
107
 The commandant of Auschwitz, Rudolf Höss, who visited Chelmno to meet Blobel 
there in September 1942, was told of experiments with explosives.
108
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Blobel’s arrival at Chelmno in June or July 1942 coincided with independent efforts by 
Bothmann and his subordinates to clean up the decomposing corpses of over 100,000 victims 
in the mass graves that had been dug in the ‘forest camp’. Chloride of lime was used from 
January 1942.
109
 It was sprinkled on the mass graves to combat the smell and was also 
evidently used in trucks and railway waggons as a cleaning agent. Records of the Lodz 
Ghetto Administration show repeated and substantial deliveries of chloride of lime, billed to 
‘Geheime Staatspolizei Litzmannstadt S’.110 This was the same abbreviation to be found on 
payments to and from Sonderkommando Kulmhof. In May 1942, the Ghetto Administration 
requested the purchase of a further 50 containers of chloride of lime “for the special action” 
(Sonderaktion), to be shipped to the “Sonderkommando”.111 
By the summer of 1942, however, the SS at Chełmno no longer needed to use chloride 
of lime to mask the smell of decomposing corpses, which had grown strong enough to 
overpower the disinfectant, as several witnesses remembered.
112
  They began to experiment 
with the burning of the corpses from the mass graves. The burning of bodies was at first 
carried out in lined pits that in at least some cases used metal grates.
113
  While some 
witnesses such as the forester Heinz May do not mention metal grates
114
, this suggests either 
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that early experiments did not use grates or that the witnesses did not get close enough to 
observe the grates. Large quantities of cement along with iron girders and rails were 
delivered over the course of  the summer of 1942.
115
  Early, smaller-scale experiments were 
more likely to escape the attention of local residents, but the onset of large-scale cremation 
would not. Stanislaw Rubach, a resident of the forest of Kośielec, in between the nearby town 
Koło and Chełmno, recorded in his diarylike contemporary notes on August 11, 1942 that 
‘from mid-July the crematorium was active.’116 Other witnesses concur on mid-July as the 
start of mass cremation.
117
  
A start date for mass cremation at Chełmno in mid-July 1942 helps make sense of the 
well-known enquiry sent on July 16, 1942 from Friedrich Wilhelm Ribbe of the Łódź ghetto 
administration to the Lodz ‘eldest’ Chaim Rumkowski regarding whether a bone mill, either 
engine-powered or hand-cranked, could be found inside the Łódź ghetto.118 This was not the 
only request to the Jewish council in Lodz for assistance in pulverising human remains; on 
August 1, 1942, Rumkowski received the following request: ‘I would like to ask you to 
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procure a stable container made of strong, at least 5mm thick tin, which is about 50 liters in 
size and in which brittle material can be crushed into fine powder.’119 A “ball mill for 
substances” supplied by a firm in Hannover was in use by September 1942. By December, 
the mill had been sent to Auschwitz for use there, but was returned to Łódź in early 1943. 120 
Multiple witnesses report the use of a bone mill at Chełmno. They describe a heavy machine 
weighing five and a half tons that was powered by a generator or compressor with a petrol 
engine.
121
  Noises from the mill were heard by Polish residents living nearby.
122
  
While the majority of documents relating to cremation at Chelmno do not explicitly 
refer to cremation, one source, previously cited by Michael Alberti but not quoted
123
, offers 
unique confirmation in a contemporary Nazi document of the cremation of the corpses of 
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Jewish victims at an extermination camp. In June 1943, the Luftwaffe counterespionage 
office ‘Research Station A Litzmannstadt’ reported as follows: 
As was already reported in NL 7299 of 25/3/43, the camp Kulmhof, Post 
Eichstädt, County Warthbrücken, to which mainly Jews unfit for work from the 
Warthegau, in particular from the Litzmannstadt ghetto, were at that time 
regularly transferred, was closed on 1/4/43. From a reliable source, the Research 
Station has now learned that the police guards there later re-exhumed the Jews 
buried in a little wood near Kulmhof and had to burn them in specially 
constructed furnaces. After being granted a lengthy leave, these guards were 
assigned to frontline duty. As is now reported, these forces have as of now been 
withdrawn in order to be equipped in Graz for a similar deployment in the South-
East.
124
  
Three days later, the Research Station noted that this report, and another report that is 
now lost, were to be treated as confidential, but that they had received indirect confirmation 
from another official, who also noted that the BBC had made broadcasts on the subject of 
Chełmno:  
The information provided by the MzA's Litzmannstadt Nr. 405 and 406 was made 
known to the Research Station by the employee Riehl, who was informed of them 
in confidence. This information has been the subject of consultation with the 
Stapostelle here. The information contained in MzA no. 406 were indirectly 
confirmed through conversation by RR.
125
 Dr. Rosse. It was noted by Dr. Rosse 
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that the British radio has dealt with Kulmhof.
 126
 
The first report’s phrasing of  ‘specially constructed ovens’ (eigens gefertigten Öfen) 
confirms and is in turn corroborated by Rubach’s diary-notes – the crematoria of Chełmno 
were constructed locally, without any known assistance from a specialist firm of crematorium 
oven manufacturers like Topf & Sons of Erfurt. This explains why we lack further documents 
which might offer more details on their exact construction or operation.   
The Research Station A report finds further corroboration in a source that serves as an 
epitaph to the Nazi attempts to surround the extermination camp of Chelmno in secrecy. As 
the report states, the staff of the camp were to be transferred to the ‘South-East’, i.e. the 
Balkans. With the closing of  Chełmno, 85 members of SS-Sonderkommando Kulmhof were 
ordered to be transferred to the Waffen-SS‘Prinz Eugen’ Division fighting Tito’s partisans in 
Yugoslavia, following a month’s leave. Before they departed, Himmler asked the head of the 
RSHA, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, to remind the men of the need for secrecy: ‘The Reichsfuhrer 
SS asks you to gather the men together again before their deployment and to oblige them 
insistently to put a line under the period of their Sonderkommando and not to speak of it even 
in passing.’127  
The evidence concerning cremation at Chelmno reveals concentric but contradictory 
layers of secrecy enacted as part of the attempted cover-up. None of the hundreds of Jewish 
workers forced to exhume and cremate the corpses of the victims of Chelmno during 1942 
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and 1943 survived to testify after the war.
128
 Yet Polish bystander testimonies as well as the 
physical evidence left behind at the site all clearly exposed what had taken place there. In 
1945 during Władysław Bednarz’s investigation as well as subsequently during 
archaeological excavations, human remains as well as remnants of the blown-up improvised 
crematoria were found at Chelmno.
129
 The documentary paper trail indicates that cremation 
was kept tightly secret inside government circles in Lodz, while invoices and correspondence 
regarding the improvised construction of the ‘field ovens’ were carefully worded to avoid any 
direct mention of cremation. Kaltenbrunner’s reminder to the SS and Police staff of the camp 
to remain silent and the transfer of the perpetrators to hazardous antipartisan duty in 
Yugoslavia were hardly sufficient measures to keep Chelmno secret in perpetuity, especially 
when news of Chelmno had already long reached the Allies and been publicised. All of this 
raises the question of who, precisely, the Nazis were trying to fool with their attempted 
cover-up through cremation. The evidence suggests that the prime target of the cover-up was 
in fact the Nazis themselves.  
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Conclusion 
The ultimate failure of Nazi attempts to cover up their crimes at Chelmno can hardly be 
disputed, yet the efforts to which the Nazis in the Warthegau went to obscure the true purpose 
of the camp and finally to remove the traces of mass murder were just as undeniably 
considerable. The sources presented above represent only part of the evidence available to 
historians on this subject, but this initial survey can provide us with several conclusions 
regarding the cover-up of Chelmno.  
Firstly, the contradictions in the cover stories aimed at the German and Jewish 
population of the Warthegau only briefly conformed to the fiction of ‘resettlement to the east’ 
that was in circulation elsewhere in Europe during the ’Final Solution’. While ‘resettlement’ 
to destinations in the occupied Soviet Union was occasionaly invoked, the Warthegau 
authorities as well as SS-Sonderkommando Kulmhof soon began a shell game with fictitious 
and deceptive destinations within the Warthegau itself as well as, paradoxically, to Germany 
and Austria. Historians have reached a strong consensus that the decision to exterminate the 
Jews of the Warthegau was taken locally, while the survival of the Lodz ghetto until 1944 is 
similarly attributed to local initiatives, due to the interests of Nazi authorities in maintaining 
industrial production. The unusual patterns of deception also make the Warthegau unique. 
The significance of local decision-making and relative lack of coordination with higher 
authorities confirms not only the importance of the ‘periphery’ in the Final Solution but also 
the polycratic structure of the Third Reich. 
Secondly, both in obfuscating as well as obliterating their crimes at Chelmno, the SS 
and Ghetto Administration relied to a considerable degree on improvisation. Despite the 
ideological importance of the ‘solution of the Jewish Question in the Warthegau’, few 
resources and relatively little planning were brought to bear on the problem. The ad hoc 
deceptions were evidently adjusted to different target audiences at different times. The 
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cremation of the corpses of the victims was carried out in crude ‘field ovens’ built by non-
specialists using locally sourced materials and fuel, after much trial and error.  
Finally, the inconsistencies and even occasional ineptitude of Nazi deception and cover-up 
attempts  should not detract from their ubiquity and persistence. As knowledge of 
extermination spread across the Warthegau and in Lodz, the Nazi authorities and SS cynically 
came up with new cover-stories, in particular inside the Lodz ghetto. Lying had become so 
integral to the implementation of the ‘Final Solution’ that the Nazi authorities may even have 
enjoyed lying to the victims. Yet the Nazis also deceived themselves through the elaboration 
of the contradictory fictions explaining away deportations regarding the success of their 
deceptions. A completely consistent cover-story never emerged, nor could one counteract the 
spread of knowledge among German officials and civilians without an immediate ‘need to 
know’ or among Jews and Poles in the region. A combination of official silence and 
unofficial dissembling also could not counter the publicity given to the news of Chelmno 
from June 1942 onwards in Allied countries. The legends of ‘resettlement’ and ‘labour 
deployment’ may have enabled some Nazi perpetrators to cope with the transgressive 
violence of genocide as it unfolded, but ultimately could not provide a credible alibi after 
1945 when key decision-makers were put on trial. The effort to erase the traces of 
extermination through cremation were equally self-deceiving due to their incompleteness. In 
the end, the attempt to cover up the crime of Chelmno only provided more evidence for the 
crime. 
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